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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
1.\ TI-IE 1\L-\ TTER 0 F 
THE ADOPTION 
OF 
SAl.L Y .AN~ DRUCE, 
A Minor. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. '7864 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_______________________ ) 
RESPC)\1)ENTS' BRIEF 
STA.TEMENT OF FACTS 
Hespondents are not satisfied that the State-
ment of Facts by Appellant is complete enough to 
convey to the Court the points. at issue and there-
fore Respondents add the following: 
The A.ppellant, ~1erlyn Druce, mother of the 
child in question, went to live with her grand-
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n1other when she was six years old (Tr. 68-69) and 
continued to live 'vith her until she married 
Charles Druce, father of the child (Tr. 69). The 
child Sally Ann Druce was born April20, 1948 (Tr. 
69) and when she was a month old she was taken to 
the home of the Appellant's grandmother and put 
in her care (Tr. 7'0). The Appellant lived at the 
home of the grandmother and worked as a wait-
ress, which occupation she has since continued to 
follow (Tr. 14-15). In November of 1948, Appel-
lant started to go out with one Lee James. The 
grandmother objected to this because Appellant 
was a married woman and because the burden 
of taking care of the child had to be borne by the 
grandmother (Tr. 7'1). The Appellant's work never 
ended later than 10:00 P.M. but she would notre-
turn to the home of the grandmother and to her 
baby earlier than 12:00 M. and fro1n that hour 
to 4:00 A.M. When she came home she usually 
smelled of intoxicating liquor (Tr. 7'1-7'2). In De-
cember the grandmother insisted that she be paid 
something for the care of the baby and the Ap-
pellant took the child away fron1 the grandmoth-
er's home (Tr. 7'2). After the baby had been gone 
a week, Appellant returned it to the grandn1other 
(Tr. 7'4). 
During all the time that the Appellant stayed 
-2-
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at the grandnlotlu.·t-'s hon1e the granchnother had 
the cart' of the child .. Appellant did not care for 
the haby. She was not there long enough to do so 
and she slept while she was there err. '72-'73). 'fhe 
granchnother was not financially able to take care 
of the child "rithout the Appellanfs help (Tr. '73). 
The grandn1other went to California in July 
of L 949 and leh the child with a daughter of the 
grandn1other. A.ppellant knew that the grand-
Inother had g·one to California but she did not 
take care of the child (Tr. '78). The grandmother 
returned in . August and again took the child. After 
the grand1nother~s return from California, the 
.\.ppellant worked at Sugar House and during a 
period of n1on ths she did not come to see the baby 
at all and con\mnnicated with the grandmother 
but once (Tr. 79). 
A.ppeJlant left Sugar House and went to Den-
ver and stayed for approximately three n1onths 
and during this tinu~ she did not coinn1unicatc 
with the grandmother or with the chiJd. \Vheu 
Appellant returned fron1 l)enver she came to the 
grandmother's home with Lee James between 3:00 
and 4:00 in the n1orning. Appellant then began 
staying with the grandmother (Tr. '79-80) and for 
about three nights she caine home at an early hour. 
-3-
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Then she started to stay away and coming in late, 
smelling of beer (Tr. 80). The grandrnt>ther had 
difficulty getting her up so as to go to work (Tr. 
80-81). In October of 1949, the grandmother asked 
for money for care of the baby and she and Ap-
pellant had words and Appellant left and she did 
not con1e home Sunday, Monday or Tuesday 
nights and came home Wednesday morning about 
2:00 o'clock, and then took the baby up out of her 
bed. Appellant then went into the bathroom, took 
off her clothes and went out to her bed on the 
porch (Tr. 82). Appellant then let Lee Jan1es into 
her bedroom (Tr. 101) and Appellant at this time 
had no clothes on (Tr. 100). 
Appellant kept company with Lee J an1es for 
three years. Appellant's grandmother objected to 
this because Lee James smoked and drank beer 
Tr. 44) and because grand111other was taking care 
of the baby while Appellant was out with Lee 
James ( (T r. 71). During this time she was with 
him practically every night and drank beer every 
night for three years (Tr. 45-46). 
Appellant left the home of the grandmother · 
in October, 1950, and during rest of 1nonth, Ap-
pellant saw Sally about three tin1es (Tr. 83). On 
a Sunday night in October she came to grand-
-4-
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Inothei:s h o 111 l~ "'ith Lee J <Unes and pro1nised 
g·ran(hnother that she would take care of Sally 
the following Tuesday. Appellant did not r-et urn 
to take care of Sally and grandn1other took Sally 
to the \\'ard House where grand1nother was at-
tending Relief Society. Appellant can1e to Ward 
House and gave grandmother $5.00 but did not 
see Sally. ,,-ho "-ns playing in the an11,useinent hall 
in the \\'ard llouse (Tr. 84) . 
.._--\ppellant Jived w·ithin three blocks of grand-
Inother's ho1ne from October, 1950 to January, 
1951, and during this ti1ne did not go to see Sal1y 
or inquire about her (Tr. 21). 
Sally never called Appellant "Man1ma". A ..p-
pellant never stayed home long enough so as to 
become acquainted with the child and let her 
kno'v who her 11an1ma was (Tr. 33). 
Grandmother is 66 years of age (Tr. 48). 
Grandmother's health was poor and she was un-
able financially to ~et vitamins and other things 
for the bahy (Tr. 85). The only incon1e she had 
was from .rental of a part of her home and monies 
she received fr·om hoarding a girl (Tr. 73). 
c;ran(hnother told Appellant she thought A.p-
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pellant ought to permit someone to adopt the child 
and all of Appellant's relatives told her the same 
thing, and they have all tried to get Appellant to 
pay n1ore attention to the child and give it better 
care and when Appellant would not do it, they 
have told her that she had better let someone adopt 
it (Tr. 38). 
Sally was taken into the Jacobsen's ho1ne the 
latter part of December, 1950, and in January, 
1951, the attorney for Respondents took Appel-
lant to the ho1ne of the Respondents to see the 
home and to see Sally (Tr. 10) and at that ti1ne 
Respondents advised Appellant that she was wel-
conie to come and see Sally any time she wanted 
to (Tr. 58). FronJ the latter part of January until 
October 23, Appellant did not again visit Re-
spondents' home and made no contact either with 
Sally or with Respondents during this period. In 
January, 1.951~ .. Appellant learned that the child, 
Sally Ann Druce, was in the hom-e of Respondents 
and fro1n that time until on or about February 8, 
1952, ~Appellant never demanded the return of 
said child {Tr. 25) and never indicated in any 
n1anner that she wished to revoke her consent to 
the adoption of said child, until the filing of the 
purported answer. 
-6-
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.:\ppellan t has never obtained a divorce fro1n 
Charles Druce (Tr. 19, 3?). Appellant entered into 
a n1arriage ceremony with one Jack Farrer in Salt 
Lake City on October 6, 1951, and on October 23, 
195 L she was living· with Jack Farrer at 918 South 
\Ye~t Te1nple as husband and wife (Tr. 2'7-28). 
Jack Farrer, at the ti1ne of the trial, was earning 
$'53.00 per ,n_•ek (Tr. 36). \Vhen Appellant was 
asked what she would do \vith the baby if award· 
ed its custody~ she said a ~1rs. Baker would tend 
her (Tr. 16). The Bakers have a one·bedroonl home 
and they have three children and Appellant and 
~Irs. Baker have always had arguments (Tr. 26). 
Respondent Sheldon A. Jacobsen is a fore1nan 
at a garage for an automobile company and earns 
$323.00 per 1nonth and owns his own home and 
has no children (Tr. 49). VVhen Sally cam!e to the 
Respondents· home, Sheldon A. Jacobsen's mother 
\vas living with Respondents and they built her 
a new ho1ne so that Sally might have the roon1 
for1nerly occupied by the grandn1other (Tr. 30). 
The other Respondent, Ruby Jacobsen, is a school 
teacher and earns $3,950.00 per year (Tr. 52). She 
would stop teaching and would he glad to stop 
\vhen it is finally detern1ined whether Respond-
ents shall he permitted to keep Sally (Tr. 32]. 
\rhen Sally caine to live with the Jacobsens, she 
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was very thin and was suffering from mastoid 
trouble and had a heart murmur and her feet were 
turning in. Respondents took the child to a foot 
specialist (Tr. 53). Since Respondents have had 
the child, she has been under the constant care 
of doctors (Tr. 54). Respondent Sheldon A. Jacob-
sen has built the child a sand pile and a swing and 
has provided a dog and a cat for the child and one 
room in the home has been set aside for a play 
room for the child (Tr. 55). 
The testin1ony concerning the alleged coercion 
by the attorney for Respondents is as follows. Ap-
pellant testified that the first conversation with 
this attorney occurred in January, 1951, and her 
testimony follo"\\Ts: 
"Q. Now, telJ as near as you can the conversa-
tion you had with Mr. Young, what he said 
and what you said? 
A. Well, he said that these people wanted to 
adopt Sally and that they would have to 
have my consent, and it was for Sally's 
benefit. And I said I didn't know, I had to 
see, I didn't think I would give my con-
sent .. And he said, "Would you like to see 
the home?'' A.nd I said, "yes." And he 
-8-
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ag·reed to take n1e down to the Jacobsen 
hon1c to see what it "'as all about and for 
n1e to find out a little In ore about it. 
Q. ~\nything further said at that time? 
A. I said that I \\'ouldn "t sign the adoption 
papers, I did state that. 
Q. Then did he leave? 
.:\. l-Ie left."' (Tr. 9-1 0) 
The next tin1e Appellant sa\v the attorney was 
fron1 two to three weeks later and the following 
conversation occurrPd: 
·'~\. He said, "\Vould you like to come down 
to Provo and see Sally?" l-Ie wanted -to 
know if I would like to come down and see 
Sally. I had said I would like to see her 
before. And I said, "yes." And so I drive 
down to Provo with Mr. Young, and visit-
ed the Jacobsen home and saw my daugh-
ter.'' (T r. 10) 
"Q. Then was anything said about your giving 
vour consent then, or did vou consent to 
ol ol 
-9-
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give it to her' 
A. No, not then. 
Q. Did you tell them you wouldn't, or you 
would consider it, or what? 
A. I would consider it, I would think about 
it, I didn't know." (Tr. 10) 
When Appellant first visited the Jacobsen 
home, counsel for Respondents said to her: "~1er­
lyn if you aren't going to let Mrs. Jacobsen adopt 
her T think you better tell the J acobsens now." 
(Tr. 57}. 
"Q. All right, when was the next time you saw 
Mr. Young 
A. He came to where I was working again, 
that was at Ronnie's Restaurant. 
Q. About how long after this?" (Tr. 10) 
In February this attorney brought papers to 
a place where Appellant was working and she 
took them over to the Broadway Coffee Shop to 
show them to a friend of hers (who was Lee 
James) {Tr. 23) and he advised her not to sign 
the papers and she did not. This attorney again 
called on her, the time does not appear when this 
-10-
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occurred, and ag·ain Appellant refused to sign the 
papers but the attorney brought Appellant to Pro-
vo (Tr. 11). Again the attorney told her it was bet-
ter for Sally and for her that she sign the adoption 
papers (Tr. 12). About three n1onths later, the 
attotney again saw Appellant (Tr. 13). 
""Q. \Vhat was said then? 
..:\.. Oh, I consented to sign the papers then, 
and we came down to Provo, and I came 
in this very sa1ne room I think, I believe, 
I don~t know, and signed the papers. 
Q. Do you know what you signed? 
.A. It was a consent to have the J acobsens go 
ahead w .. ith the adoption." (Tr. 13). 
The attorney had not contacted Appellant for 
about three n1onths prior to October 22, and had 
been in conversation "\\7ith i\ppellant only about 
a minute when Appellant agreed that the Re-
spondents should be allowed to adopt the child 
(Tr. 21). Appellant agreed on October 22, 1951 
that if the attorney would come to Salt Lake and 
get her that she "\\7ould come to Provo the next day 
and give her. consent to the adoption (Tr. 21-22). 
After the adoption papers were signed, Appellant, 
- 11-
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Sally and Mrs. Jacobsen went for a ride for about 
half an hour and Appellant raised no question or 
objection to having signed the consent to adoption 
(Tr. 22). After leaving ~Irs. Jacobsen, Appellant 
went to the home of her relatives and told them 
that she had consented to the adoption (Tr. 22-23). 
She did not tell them that she had been coerced 
into consenting and told them she thought that it 
was for the best interests of the child that it be 
adopted by the ] acobsens and told them that be-
cause it was in the best interests of Sally (Tr. 23). 
Testimony relating to coercion by the rela-
tives follo,vs 
"Q. Now, did anybody else use any persau-
sions or influence upon you to sign this 
consent? 
A. \Vhy of course, they were after me from 
Jan nary, 1951 until I signed the consent. 
Q. I am speaking of besides Mr. Young and 
the J acobsens. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who? 
A. My family said it was best." (Tr. 28-29). 
-12-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant called her grandn1other and other 
relatives and sought their advice as to whether it 
"Tas best for her to consent to the adoption (Tt·. 29). 
The grandn1other and all relatives told Ap-
pellant they thoug·ht it 'vas best that someone 
adopt the child. They tried to get Appellant to 
pay n1ore attention to the child and give it better 
care and ,vhen she didn't do it, her relatives told 
Appellant that she had better let so1neone adopt 
it (T r. 38). 
The Respondents will endeavor to answer Ap-
pellant's points in the order in which they appear. 
STA.TEJVfENT OF POINTS 
I. 
APPELL.ANT"S FIRST C 0 NT E NT I 0 N IS 
THAT THE PETITlO~ FILED BY RESPOND-
E.\TS IS INSlJFFlCIENT TO GIVE THE 
COUHT jlJRJSDICTlON AND THIS ARGU-
l\1E~T IS PREMLSED ON THE GROUND 
THAT PETITION l)OES NOT ALLEGE TH.AT 
THE CONSENT OF 1'HE FA.THER H.AS BEEN 
OBTAINED. 
-13-
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TI-IE CONSENT OF NATURAL PARENTS IN 
AN ADOPTION CASE IS A MATTER OF PRO-
CEDURE UNDER THE STATUTE, AND NOT 
OF PLE~L\DING. AN ADOPTION PETITION 
IS NOT SUBJECT TO A ~lOTION TO DIS-
MISS BECi\lJSE THERE IS NO ALLEGATION 
TI-IAT CONSE~~T OF N.ATURAL PARENTS 
HAS BEEN OBTAINED. 
II. 
APPELLANT, "BY HER PLEADINGS, RAISES 
THE QlJESTIO-N AS TO vVI-IETHER SHEW AS 
A FIT AND PROPER PERSON TO HAVE THE 
CARE A.ND ClJSTODY OF THE 1\1JNOR 
CHILD AND THE FINDINGS OFF ACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WERE RESPON-
SIVE TO THE ISSUE THUS RAISED. 
III. 
TI-IE RECORD DISCLOSES THAT APPEL-
LANT FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY AND 
WITHOUT COERCION CONSENTED TO 
THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR CHILD. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT AP-
PELLANT COULD NOT ARBITRARILY HE-
- VOKE HER CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION 
WAS CORRECT. 
-14-
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~-\RGUMENT 
I. 
APPELLANT'S FIRST C 0 NT EN T I 0 N IS 
TI-L-\ T THE PETITION FILED BY RESPOND-
E~TS IS INSUFFICIENT TO GIVE THE 
COURT JURISDICTION AND THIS ARGU-
l\IE~T IS PRE~llSED ON THE GROUND 
TH~-\T PETITION DOES NOT ALLEGE THAT 
THE CONSENT OF THE FATHER HAS BEEN 
OBTAJ~ED. 
THE CONSENT OF NATURAL PARENTS IN 
A.~ ADOPTION CASE IS A MATTER OF PRO-
CEDURE UNDER THE STATUTE, AND NOT 
OF PLEADING. AN ADOPTION PETITION 
IS NOT SUBJECT TO A MOTION TO DIS-
~HSS BECAUSE THERE IS NO ALLEGATION 
THAT CONSENT OF NATURAL PARENTS 
Hi-\S BEEN OBTAINED. 
The attorney for Appellant seems to nliscon-
ceive the issues in this case. Counsel argues in his 
hrief now as he did at the inception of this case, 
that because we had not at that time obtained the 
consent of the father, that our petition was insuf-
ficient. 'Ve realized. perhaps even better than 
counsel for Appellant. that the adoption proceed-
- 13-
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ings could not be completed without the consent 
of the father. Had we had his consent, the decree 
of adoption would have been entered long before 
Appellant had a change of mind. Counsel for i\p-
pellant has never represented Charles Druce, 
father of the child, and we subn1it that his con-
tention is untenable. 
For a long tin1e we could not locate the father 
of the child and when we were able to locate hin1, 
we learned that he was in Korea serving in the 
United States A .rn1ed Forces. vVe therefore felt 
that the Court would not look with favor upon 
any petition which sought to have the Court enter 
a decree that the father had deserted the child. 
Vve believe that the father would, on his retur·n. 
give his consent io the adoption and in this belief, 
events have proved that we were right. It was 
while awaiting his return that Appellant filed 
what she characterized '~Answer to Petition for 
i~doption of a Minor Child .. , Actually~ this so-
called Answer should have been denominated a 
petition to revoke Appellant's consent but what-
ever its proper nomenclature, it was clearly un-
derstood that the issues and pleadings raised two 
questions. First: Did Appellant have the right to 
revoke her consent to the adoption? Second: If 
she had that right, was she a fit and proper person 
-16-
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to haYe custody of the n1inor child? 
Counsel for A.ppellant see1ned to recognize 
that these ''rere the issues as shown by his plead-
ings and also as shown by his sta te1nen t at the 
conclusion of the trial, in which counsel for Ap-
pellant stated: ··1 take it that the purpose of this 
hearing today is asking· the Court to deter1nine 
"rhether ?\Ierlyn is a fit and proper person to have 
this child? .. and to which ~ounsel for Respondents 
replied, ··res, and as to whether she can now with-
clrtnv her consent already given." (Tr. 110). 
II. 
APPELLANT, BY HER PLEADINGS, RAISES 
THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER SHE WAS 
A FIT AND PROPER PERSON TO HAVE THE 
CARE AND CUSTODY OF THE MINOR 
CHILD AND THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF THE LAW WERE RE-
SPONSIVE TO THE ISSUE THUS RAISED. 
Under Point II. counsel for Appellant argues 
that the proceedings "\Vere not had to determine, 
whether Appe1lani was a fit and proper person 
to have custody of her eh ild. We sub1nit that this 
issue was raised by _Appellant in her pleadings 
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and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and the Decree are in conformity with the issue 
thus raised. Counsel seems to recognize that this 
is so because he proceeds to dwell upon that part 
of the evidence in an attempt to show that A.ppel-
lant was and is a fit and proper person to have 
the care and custody of the minor child. 
Counsel cites the case of Stuber vs. Stuber, 
244 Pac. 2d 650 for the proposition that n1erely 
because the mother of the child lived with a man 
whon1 she expected to marry does not in itself 
Inake her an unfit and improper person to have 
the custody of the child. With that proposition 
"ve have no argun1ent, provided that the Inother 
is otherwise qualified. The facts in this case are 
quite different than in the Stuber case. In this 
case, the Appellant associated abnost constantly 
for approxin1ately three years with a man other 
than the one she entered into a purported n1ar-
riage with and during this period drank intoxi-
cating liquor nearly every night and seldom re-
turned to her hon1e where her child was living 
earlier than 2:00 A.l\f. (Tr. 44-45-46, 71-72). Her 
whole attitude to"vard the child has been one of 
indifference and she has shown a total lack of 
filial attachment for the child. Appellant may not. 
as urged by her counsel, have had illicit relations 
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"·i th Lee J <:unes, but the circumstantial evidence 
as pointed out herein would indicate otherwise. 
_\ppel1ant cites the case of Cooke vs. Cooke. 
et al .. 6:' Utah 3:-1, 2-t-8 Pac. 83 and we adopt what 
"·as therein stated and sub1ni t that the evidence 
in this ease is posit i Yl' and not speculative as to the 
unfitness of the Appellant. 
\re recognize that, even though the evidence 
sho"\vs ... \ppellant has been indifferent to the wel-
fare vf her child and that she is morally unfit to 
have its custody, if she has a right to revoke the 
consent these factors would not prevent her from 
so doing. But as will be hereinafter pointed out, 
ihe welfare of the child is a determining factor as 
to "Thether consent Ina y be revoked. 
III. 
THE RECORD DISCLOSES THAT APPEL-
LA:~T FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY AND 
WITHOUT C 0 E R C I 0 N CONSENTED TO 
THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR CHILD. 
Appellant's first paragraph of his argument 
on this point has nothing to do with the question 
of coercion, duress, or persuasion but the state-
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Inenis therein contained are so erroneous that we 
cannot let the In go unchallenged. Contrary to 
what counsel for Appellant states, Sally was not 
taken from the nursery home by the grand1nother, 
and the child was in the grandmother's home ap-
proximately one year after its return by Appel-
lant from the nursery to the grandmother's hon1e. 
The Court found such to be the case. 
We now address ourselves to the question of 
coercion. In our Statement of Facts, we have set 
out nearly all, if not all, of the evidence concern-
ing the question of coercion. Appellant claims that 
the attorney for Respondents and that Appellant ·s 
relatives coerced her in to signing the consent to 
adoption. Appellant's own testi1nony sho,vs that 
this attorney called on her five times during the 
course of about nine n1onths (Tr. 30). Appellant 
states that she refused to sign any adoption papers 
on each of the first four visits but that on ihe fifth 
visit she agreed to go to Provo and sign the consent 
that the child he adopted. Appellant stated that 
three months elapsed between the fourth and fifth 
visits and that the attorney had not been in her 
presence more than one minute when she agreed 
to consent to the adoption (Tr. 21). The evidence 
quoted in the Statement of Facts shows that after 
the consent had been signed in open Court, Ap-
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pellan t \\'as taken to her relatiYes and that in their 
presence she stated that it "vas in the best interests 
of Sally that the J acobsens adopt the child (Tr. 
)-) 
:.. " . 
The grandn1other is accused by counsel for 
Appellant of exerting coercion upon Appellant to 
consent to thP adoption. The grand1nother testi-
fied that after the J acobsens took the baby, she 
did not see Inuch of _\.ppellant thereafter (Tr. 91) 
and \Ve subn1it that the n1ost that can be said 
about the grandtnother·s attitude and that of Ap-
pellant"s aunts is that they were concerned about 
the welfare of the child and requested Appellant 
to either give the child a Inother's love and atten-
tion or per1nit its adoption (Tr. 85-96). Other mat-
ters quoted by .Appellant in her brief regarding 
the n1atter of coercion occurred so1ne time after 
October 23, 193 i, when her consent was given. 
\Ve are not clear as to why counsel for Appel-
lant cites the cases of Taylor vs. TVaddoups, found 
in 24-1 Pac. 2d 15?, but whatever his purpose we 
feel the case supports our position. Mr. Chief Jus-
tice \Volfe, in his opinion, quotes Section 14-4-9, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, hereinafter set forth 
verbn.tim and which in effect provides that the 
Court must exan1ine all persons appearing before 
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it, separately. In obtaining Appellant's consent we 
did exactly what Section 14-4-9 requires and what 
the Court said in Taylor vs. Waddoups should 
he done. We think it must he assumed that when 
Appellant went into Court and gave her consent, 
that the Court discharged its duty. The Court saw 
her den1eanor on the stand and explained to Ap-
pellant what would he the effect of her consent. 
There is not the slightest evidence in this record 
that on the day that Appellant gave her consent 
that she was under any strain or that she was suf-
fering from discouragement or despair. On the 
contrary, the record is replete with evidence that 
she kne'v what she was doing, that she felt it was 
in the best interests of the child, and that her con-
sent was voluntarily and freely given. The case 
of Bilderback, et al. vs. Clark, et al., 189 Pac. 97? 
is not in point, hut we agree with the sentence 
extracted from that opinion, which is found in 
Appellant's brief. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT APPEL-
LANT COULD NOT ARBITRARILY REVOKE 
HER CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION WAS 
CORRECT. 
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Before proceeding with our argu1nent in sup· 
port of our position that a parent may not arbi-
trarily revoke consent to the adoption where the 
consent has been freely given, we at the outset 
concede that adoption was unknown at common 
law· and that the statutes must be strictly followed. 
In n1any of the cases to which reference will be 
n1ade hereafter, the decisions turn upon the word-
ing of the statutes and we think the decision in 
this case is also largely controlled by our statutes. 
Later we shall set forth those sections of our stat-
utes having to do wtih adoption proceedings, but 
for the present we call attention to the case of 
Stanford vs. Gray, 42 Utah 228, 129 Pac. 423 which 
case interprets Sections 14-? -41 and 14-? -42, Utah 
Code .~Annotated 1943. 
The plaintiff instituted suit in habeas corpus 
in the State of Utah to recover a minor child born 
out of wedlock. The mother, while living in Cali-
fornia, "\Vrote to the California Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children asking the So-
ciety to find son1.eone willing to adopt the child. 
Later she signed an agreement authorizing the 
Society to place the child with so:n.eone for adop-
tion and waiving notice of the hearing on the pro-
ceeding for adoption. The defendants were at that 
time living in California and the child was placed 
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in their ho1ne and later they moved to Salt Lake 
City. 1'he plaintiff came to Salt Lake and insti-
tuted proceedings to recover the child. The lower 
court granted the writ. Our Supreme Court re-
versed the lower court and in its opinion, stated 
that it assumed that the laws of California were 
the same as those of Utah unless the contrary was 
shown, and the Court interpreted Section '720x27 
Con1piled Laws of Utah 190'7, which is now Sec-
tion 14-'7-41 and Section 14-'7-42 Utah Code Anno-
tated 1943. In this case the mother sought to have 
her consent set aside, claiming that she executed 
the agreement under irresistible pressure of cir-
cunlstances and that her mind at the time she 
signed the document was, and for several weeks 
prior thereto had been excited and disordered. 
The Supreme Court found this issue against her. 
"We now co1ne to the question of whether, 
under all of the facts and circumstances as 
disclosed by the record, the social and intel-
lectual training, as well as the future happi-
ness, of the child. would be better promoted 
by restoring it to the custody of Mrs. Hansen 
than by leaving it in the care, control and 
custody of appellants. As we have pointed 
out, the weight of authority, which of course 
includes the better reasoned cases, holds that. 
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,,·here a parent in writing voluntarily •·e-
linquishes and surrenders the eustod y of his 
infant child to the custody of another: he can-
not n·eoyer the custody ot= the child in his own 
rig·ht: and. "'here th~ parent in such case 
con1es before the coud seeking to recover the 
custody of the child the burden is on hin1 
to show. not on his own behalf, but on behalf 
of the child, that it is not receiving the proper 
care. or that its physical, moral and intel-
lectual training· is not what it should be. The 
right. therefore. of a parent in such case to 
the custody of the child, does not depend 
altog·ether on the question of whether he is a 
suitable person to have the care and custody 
of the chi]d as counsel for respondent seem 
to contend. Tested by the foregoing rule~ 
,,,hich we think is a wholesome one, do the 
facts in the case support the decree of the 
court? We think not. The court found, and 
the finding is supported by the evidence, that 
appellants, ever since the child was given 
into their custody, have 'kept, n1.aintained, 
nursed~ and supported him with the utn10st 
care and tenderness and have formed a deep 
attachment and affection for him and are 
desirous of continuing to supnort and educqte 
him * 7': * and are amply able to maintain, 
educate, and support said child~ and are in 
all respects fit and suitable persons to adoT1t 
him and to have his custody and control.' We 
do not wish to be understood as holding. or 
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even intimating, that the Hansens are un-
suitable persons to have the care and custody 
of the child in question. What we do hold is 
that, Mrs. Hansen having voluntarily relin-
quished and surrendered her right to the care 
and custody of the child, the burden is on her 
to show that the parties who acquired the 
custody of the child by virtue and in pursu-
ance of the relinquishmet have in some way 
been derelict in their duty to the child, and 
that it would be better for the best interests 
of the child to take it out of their custody and 
return it to her. This she has wholly failed 
to do." (p. 428) 
Section 14-7-41, lJtah Code Annotated 1943, 
reads as follows: 
"No parent or guardian or other person, 
who by instrument of writing surrenders, or 
has surrendered heretofore, the custody of a 
child to any children's aid society or insti-
tution, shall thereafter, contrary to the tertns 
of such instrument. be entitled to custody or 
control or authority over, or any right to in-
terfere with, any such child, and these san1e 
conditions shall prevail where the child is or 
has been delivered to a children's aid society 
or institution by the action of any proper 
court." 
It will be noted that a parent who surrenders 
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the custody of a child to a children's aid society 
tnay not thereafter change his m.ind. 
Section J 4-4-.J. of the Code is as follows: 
··A leg·inutte child cannot be adopted with-
out the consent of its parents, if living, nor 
an illegiti1nate child without the consent of its 
Inother, if living, except that consent is not 
necessary fron1 a father or mother who has 
been judicia1ly deprived of the custody of the 
child on account of cruelty, neglect or deser-
tion: provided. that the district court n1ay or-
der the adoption of any child, without notice 
to or consent in court of the parent or parents 
thereof, whenever it shall appear that the 
parent or parents whose consent would other-
"vise he required have theretofore, in writing, 
acknowledged before any officer authorized 
to take acknowledgment, released his or her 
or their con tr·ol or custody of such child to any 
agency licensed to receive children for place-
Inent or adoption under Chapter 3 of this 
Title, and such agency consents, in writing, to 
such adoption.'' 
It thus appears that there are but two ways 
in which a parent may give consent to the adop-
tion of a child. (1) In the manner provided by 
Section 14-? -41, supra., and (2) By appearing in 
court and consenting to the adoption. No express 
provision prohibits a change of mind by a parent 
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where he has appeared in court, yet it would seen1 
consent given in court should be as final as con-
sent given to a placement agency. Both agreements 
are in writing and the court is surely as able to 
judge whether the consent is voluntarily given 
as is the e1nployee of the agency. It must be as-
suined in this case that the Court discharged its 
duty and if Appellant was acting under any emo-
tional strain or coercion, we are certain that the 
court would not have permitted the Appellant 
to consent to the adoption. 
We now proceed to discuss the authorities 
found in other jurisdictions. We believe that a 
Inajority of the authorities dealing with the ques-
tion of the right of a parent to withdraw consent 
to adoption will be found in 138 ALR 1038, in 
156 ALR 1011, and in the 1952 ALR Blue Book~ 
Supplemental Decisions, 11th Issue. In discussing 
the cases hereinafter cited, we do so upon the 
premise that the Court's finding that no undue 
influence or coercion was used in obtaining Ap-
pellan f s consent was correct. 
It will be note<:} that the author states, in 138 
ALR 1038, that in a majority of the jurisdictions 
where the matter has arisen the parent n1ay arbi-
trarily effectively revoked consent. But even in 
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those cases it is said that in the reported decisions 
the question is left open whether in every situation 
the natural parent is entitled to arbitrarily with-
dra"· consent after the adoption ordet· has been 
n1ade, but under this citation are Inan y cases 
"·hich hold to the contrary. See: 1Vyness vs. Crow-
ley, ~9.2 i\[ass. 461. 198 N.E. 758 in which the court 
said: 
·· ... a natural parent who has duly consented 
to the adoption of a child by indorsing her 
consent upon the petition for adoption cannot 
thereafter arbitrarily withdraw her consent 
notwithstanding that at the time it is endeav-
ored to revoke such consent the hearing has 
not been had on the merits of the petition and 
no final decree has been entered thereon." 
The trend of the more recent decisions seetns 
to be contrary to the cases cited in 138 ALR, supra, 
as is shown below. In 156 ALR 1011, the author 
states: 
"While, as brought out in the earlier anno-
tation, there is authority for the view that a 
natural parent's consent to the proposed adop-
tion of a child, duly given in compliance with 
a statute requiring such consent as a prerequi-
site to an adoption, may be effectively with-
drawn or revoked by the natural parent be-
fore the adoption has been finally approved 
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and decreed bv the court, * * * (citing cases) 
* * * and a few .. courts have indicated that the 
right to withdraw consent is absolute and not 
dependent upon any particular reason, * * * 
(citing cases) * * * it must now be said, in view 
of the later cases (arising, it will be noted in 
jurisdictions other than those represented in 
earlier annotation), that the trend of the more 
recent authority is toward the position that 
where a natural parent has freely and know-
ingly given the requisite consent to the adop-
tion of his or her child, and the proposed adop-
tive parents have acted upon such consent 
by bringing adoption proceedings, the con-
sent is ordinarily binding upon the natural 
parent and cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn 
so as to bar the court from decreeing the adop-
tion, particularly where, in reliance upon such 
consent, the proposed adoptive parents have 
taken the child into their custody and care 
for a substantial period of tin1e, and honds 
of affection, in the nature of a 'vested right~' 
have been forged between them and the 
child." 
In Re ~Adoption of a ~1inor, 144 Fed. 2d 644·~ 
and reported in 156 A.LR at page 1001, is a cas~ 
in which the facts are soine,vhat analogous to the 
instant case and the law which pern1its adoption 
is somewhat sin1ilar to the Utah law pertaining 
to that subject. 'Ve quote from the decision: 
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""The single issue of the case in one of law, 
whether a natural n1other~ who has freely and 
voluntarily g·iyen consent to the adoption of 
her illegitin1ate child, can, without cause, 
''Tithdr<Tw· that consent and thus prevent the 
adoption "'hen, as in the present case, the 
adoptive parents have accepted the child, 
paid the expenses of prenatal and postnatal 
care. n1ade a home for the child and in all 
respects satisfied the requirements of the law 
governing adoption." 
The court, in its decision~ quoted fro1n W yness vs. 
Crowley supra.: 
'"To accede to the contention that such vol-
untary consent Inay he withdrawn would be 
equivalent to saying that parties may come to 
a court, deliberately give their assent to 
actions by the court in matters affecting their 
interests, and afterwards, at their will and 
pleasure, return to the court and undo what 
they did because on a future day they did not 
like it.·~ 
The court further says: 
"We agree with this statement and think 
that Congress, in enacting the District statute~ 
intended to prevent just such results as those 
denounced hy the ~1assachusetts court." 
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The District of Columbia statute is as follows: 
"If adoptee is under twent-one years of 
age, no decree of adoption shall be made un-
less the court shall find that the following 
persons have consented to the adoption: 
Adoptee, if fourteen or more years of age; and 
the natural parents or adoptive parents by a 
previous adoption, if living. The consent of 
the father of an adoptee born out of wedlock 
shall not be necessary unless he has both 
acknowledged the adoptee and contributed 
voluntarily to its support." 
The court further says: 
"In in te.rpreting this language the trial 
judge concluded that consent of the natural 
n1other acco1n pan ying the petition was not 
sufficient; that in order to satisfy the law she 
must be actually, presently consenting at the 
time of the hearing and, presumably, until the 
final order of adoption has been entered. 
That, however, is not what the statute savs. 
It' speaks, instead, in the perfect tense-'~n­
less the court shall find that the follow·ing 
persons have consented to the adoption' - in 
other words, it speaks of an act completed." 
Further, the court says: 
"In our opinion, Congress intended that 
consent of a parent once given and acted upon 
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should not be ".,.ithdrawn without cause." 
ln the case of Ex parte Barents reported in 
222 Pac. 2d 488 the California court held that 
consent for adoption could not be revoked. The 
facts, in brief, were as follows: 
The action was one in habeas corpus insti-
tuted by the n1other of an illegitimate child. The 
c-hild \\'as born on May 11, 1949. Four days later 
she signed a 'vritten instrument stating that she 
was g·iving the infant into the possession of the 
respondents for the purpose of adoption and that 
she would sign any further document necessary 
to effectuate such adoption. On June 17 respond-
ents. having had the infant in their possession 
since the Inother gave it to the1n, filed a petition 
for adoption. On July 28 the n1other signed a 
consent to adoption in the presence of an agent 
of the Departn1ent of Social Welfare. On October 
20 following, she gave to the Department a docu-
Inent entitled "withdrawal of consenf', stating 
that she did thereby withdraw her consent to the 
adoption of the child and thereafter she filed the 
suit in habeas corpus. No evidence was introduced 
and the case was disposed of purely upon issues 
of law. 
It was the mother's contention that although 
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consent to adoption had been given, she had a 
right to withdraw it at any time before the final 
decree of adoption should have been made by the 
Superior Court and therefore, having withdrawn 
her consent, that the court was 'vithout juriscl[e-
tion to proceed further in the adoption proceed-
ings. This case was decided on October 2, 1950. In 
1949 the California Legislature added a statutory 
provision which provided that once consent is 
g·iven to adoption it could not he withdrawn ex-
cept with court approval. This legislation went 
into effect after the consent of the petitioner had 
.been given but before her attempted withdrawal 
of that consent. The court decidedthe case upon 
the basis of the law which was in effect. prior to 
the enactment of the statute. The court, in its 
decision, says: 
"But in our opinion petitioner here, having 
given her consent under the statute in force 
at the time and in the forn1 in which she gave 
it, was not free to withdraw the same or to 
revoke it n1erely bacause she had changed her 
mill~' whether that change originated in 
whim and caprice or rationally by reason of 
changed conditions, which latter ground she 
avers in her petition. When the Legislature, 
exercising its wellnigh plenary power over 
the subject of adoptions, required the consent 
of a parent or parents to the adoption of a 
child and when it provided that such consent 
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should be given by execution of a for1n pre-
scribed by the Deparhnent and before an 
ag·ent thereof; \vhen it provided further that 
this consent should be accepted by the Depart-
Inent and filed in the adoption proceedings, it 
could on I y have meant, although not express-
ly so declaring·. as is later did, that the consent 
w·hich the statute required was then to be con-
sidered as having been given frrevocably. W c 
think that fron1 that n1on1ent on the consent 
eontinued without the power of revocation 
until the court should have ruled on the adop-
tion. This asstunes, of course, that the consent 
\nls. as the forin declared it to be, fully and 
freelv given \Vi thout fraud or duress, but we 
think that \vhen such real consent had been 
so given it was intended that the statutory 
requisite of eonsent had thereby been irrevoc-
ably supplied.'' 
.Another interesting California case is Re 
Adoption of PilchPr, found in 230 Pac. 2d 449, 
decided on April 27, 1951. In this case the child 
'vas born on Deccn1ber 20, 1949. A petition for 
adoption "\Vas filed on December 22, 1949. On Jan-
uary 30. 1950, a representative of the State De-
partnlent of Social \Velfare saw the mother rela-
tive to obtaining the usual background informa-
tion and to see about obtaining the written consent 
of appellant to the adoption. Appellant was ad-
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vised to think the matter over carefully and the 
agent returned in March, 1950 and at the ti1ne 
appellant signed the written consent. On April 
19, 1950, Appellant, through her mother as guard-
ian, petitioned the court for permission to with-
draw her consent to the adoption on the claimed 
ground that she was embarrassed and confused 
at the ti1ne of giving her consent and that she was 
assured by the Social Welfare Department that 
she could withdraw her consent by merely writing 
a letter of withdrawal to the Judge of the court 
1n which the adoption proceeding was pending. 
The Social vVelfare Department filed its writ-
ten report reciting the facts generally as related 
and found that the minor child was receiving 
good care in the home of the proposed adopting 
parents and that they had built a nursery roon1 
for the child and had taken out a policy of insur-
ance for the child's education. The petition for 
her withdrawal of consent was denied. Appellant 
appealed from that order and contended that the 
order should be reversed because there never was 
a valid consent given to the adoption due to the 
tender years of appellant, due to undue influence 
exercised upon her, a~d due to fraud and her 
Inistake. 
Section 226a of the California Code provides: 
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'"Once given. consent of the natural parents 
to the adoption of the child by the person or 
persons to 'vhose adoption of the child the con-
sent ''"as given, 1nay not be withdrawn except 
"'i th court approval." 
The court, in its decision, says: 
··_.A.fter hearing the evidence the court was 
justified in concluding that appellant knew 
or should hav~ known that she could with-
draw the consent signed by her only upon 
offering a suitable plan for the child and oh-
taining court approval of the withdrawal. 
The question as to whether the consent was 
obtained under mistake, fraud or undue in-
fluence, as well as the question of the reason-
ableness of the application for the order 
sought and the questions of the child's best 
interest and welfare were all factual questions 
for the trial court to determine. A mere read-
ing of the evidence produced shows that no 
abuse of discretion appears in the court's rul-
ing.~~ 
and then the court cites a number of cases, many 
of which are found in 1 ~6 ALR, 1001. 
Another interesting case is that of Ex parte 
Schultz, 181 Pac. 2d 585, from the Supreme Court 
of Nevada. This is an action in habeas corpus 
instituted by the mother of a child horn out of 
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wedlock against prospe<·tive adopting parents. 
The child was born October 21, 1946 and on No-
vember '7, 1946 the mother signed a purported 
relinquishment for adoption. Formal request for 
the return of the child was not tnade by the 1nother 
until December 6, 1946 and the proceeding in 
habeas corpus was initiated January 29, 194'7. 
The court poses three problems. (1) 'Vas the re-
lease and relinquishment valid? (2) If valid, is 
it revocable? (3) If revocable, is it for the best 
interest and welfare of the child to allow it to be 
revoked? The statutes of Nevada pertaining to 
adoption are very sitnilar to ours. In its decision~ 
the court says: 
"'T'he principal question raised by this pro-
ceeding is the right of the mother to revoke 
her relinquishtnent. Counsel have fully 
briefed this point. The authorities cited indi-
cate that 1nany courts have per1nitted revoca-
tion at the discretion of the parent; others 
allow revocation if estoppel or welfare of the 
child do not intervene.* * * (citing cases) * * * 
"Conversely n1any tribunals have denied 
the right to revoke, and base such denials on 
(1) principles of contract; '(2) estoppel or other 
equitable grounds; (3) Public policy favoring 
adoption of children, particularly illegitin1ate 
chi]dren, or (4) the welfare of the child as 
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apparent fron1 the facts." 
and an1ong the eases cited is that of Stanford vs. 
Crlly, supra. \Ve quote what the court said: 
""Ordinarily the law presumes that the best 
interest of the child will be subserved by al-
lowing it to ren1ain in the custody of the 
parents, no n1a tter how poor and h u1nble they 
n1ay be, though wealth and worldly advance-
nten t Ina y be offered in the ho1ne of another. 
\\"here, ho"7ever, a parent, by writing or 
otherwise, has voluntarily transferred and de-
livered his minor child into the custody and 
under the control of another, as in the case at 
bar! and then seeks to recover possession of 
the child by writ of habeas corpus, such 
parent is invoking the exercise of the equitable 
discretion of the court to disrupt private do-
Inestic relations which he has voluntarily 
brought about, and the court will not grant 
the relief, unless upon a hearing of all the 
facts it is of the opinion that the best interests 
of the child would be promoted thereby." 
Another case which holds that the welfare 
of the child is paran1ount is that of Walton V.';. 
Coffman, 110 lTtah 1, 169 Pac. 2d 9?. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully subntit that the evidence con-
clusively shows that .A.ppellant's consent to the 
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adoption of her child by Respondents was volun-
tarily given and that Appellant was not and is not 
a fit and proper person to have custody and con-
trol of the Ininor child and that it would be in 
the best interests and for the welfare of the child 
that Appellant be not pe~mitted to withdraw her 
consent, so that Respondents may complete the 
adoption proceedings. 
Respectfully Subn1itted 
DALLAS H. YOUNG 
of the Firm of 
YOITNG, YOUNG & SORENSEN 
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